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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
November 25 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 81-430 CSY 
Illinois 
v. 
Gates, et ux. 
Cert to Ill S Ct (Ward for the 
court; Moran [diss] with 
Underwood) 
State/Criminal Timely 
SUMMARY: The state contends that a letter from an 
-.. 
anonymous informer, together with corroborating circumstances, 
-
was sufficient probable cause under Aguilar for issuance of a 
-
search warrant. 
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW: 
----
Police in Bloomingdale, 
Illinois, received an anonymous letter regarding the resps. It 
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listed their address and stated that they made their living 
selling drugs. Further, the letter described their method of 
operation. According to the letter, resp Sue would drive resps' 
car to Florida where it would be loaded with drugs. Resp Lance 
would fly to Florida and drive the car back. Then Sue would 
return by plane. Moreover, the letter warned that Sue would 
drive to Florida on May 3 as part of another drug transaction. 
And, the letter told the police that resps had over $100,000 in 
drugs in their basement. 
With the help of a confidential informant who provided 
police with access to financial records, the police confirmed 
that the letter gave resps' correct address. Police also 
discovered that L. Gates had a reservation on a May 5 flight to 
Florida. A DEA agent followed Lance, who flew to Florida and 
went to a motel room registered to Sue. The agent saw Lance 
leave with a woman (presumably Sue) in a car with Illinois tags. 
The police found that the tags were registered in Lance's name, 
but for a different car. 
The police then obtained a search warrant from an Illinois 
court to search resps' home and the car they were using in 
Florida. Resps arrived back at their home by car on May 7. The 
police were waiting, searched the trunk of resps' car, and found 
350 lbs of marijuana. 
-
drug paraphernalia 
cocaine. 
In the house were marijuana, weapons, and 
-
In addition, resps were in possession of 
Resps were indicted for drug offenses, and Lance was charged 
with possession of an unlicensed firearm. Pretrial, resps moved 
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to suppress the fruits of the search, contending that the letter 
did not provide probable cause for the warrant. They argued that 
the anonymous letter did not set forth the underlying -
circumstances on which the informer based his report or 
underlying circumstances which would indicate that the letter was 
reliable, as required by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 u.s. 108 (1964). 
They also contended that the police investigation did not 
corroborate the accusation that the resps were involved in 
criminal activity. The trial court agreed with resps, and the 
Ill Ct App affirmed. 
The Ill S Ct also affirmed. Aguilar has two prongs, a 
"basis of knowledge'' prong and a veracity prong. The letter 
fails the first test, because it did not describe how the 
informer knew that resps were involved in the drug trade. The 
informer's report may have been based on hearsay, not the 
informer's personal observation. The letter also fails the 
veracity test, because the police had no idea who the informer 
was. They had no way of knowing whether the informer could be 
trusted or not. And, unlike the informer in United States v. 
Harris, 403 u.s. 573 (1971), this informant made no statement 
against penal interest. 
Furthermore, the corroborating police investigation did not 
--cure these deficiencies. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 u.s. 
410  (1969). The police determined that the informer gave resps' 
---
correct address and that resps' were driving back from Florida, 
-. 
but those details did not es tablish that the informer's letter 
was based on personal knowledge rather than rumor. Also, the 
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police investigation discovered no criminal activity before the 
search. Thus, the police had no reason to think that this 
anonymous informer wrote from personal knowledge or that he was 
reliable. The investigation was not sufficient to satisfy 
Aguilar. 
The dissent thought that the corroborating investigation, 
combined with the detail of the letter, satisfied Augilar. The 
corroborating information demonstrated that the informer had an 
adequate basis for his knowledge. This case is like Draper v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), in which the police confirmed 
the details of an informer's story to obtain probable cause. The 
corroborating information also showed that the informer was 
probably telling the truth. The police may have discovered only 
innocent activity, but the informer's letter contained many 
details which proved accurate, so that the innocent activity 
became suspicious in light of the letter's accusations. 
CONTENTIONS: The state elaborates on the arguments of the 
dissent. When an informer's tip is sufficiently detailed, it 
will confirm itself. See Spinelli, 393 u.s. at 425 (White, J., 
concurring). This case is like Draper, in which the informer's 
report was corroborated and the Court found probable cause. It 
is not like Spinelli, in which the Court found no probable cause 
because the informer provided few details and the police -
investigation supplied only limited corroboration. See also 
-
Whitely v. Warden, 401 u.s. 560 (1971) (informant's tip can supply 
probable cause together with information gathered by police). In 
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addition, under Draper, innocent activity can help to provide 
probable cause, if it corroborates an informant's story . 
Resps observe that all three Illinois courts determined: (1) 
the anonymous letter did not describe the means by which the 
informer obtained his information; (2) the corroboration of 
innocent detail was insufficient to cure the inadequate "basis of 
knowledge" information in the letter; (3) reliance on Draper is 
misplaced, because that case involved a previously reliable 
informer, one who supplied a greater degree of specificity of 
detail. 
Resps also insist that this is a fact-bound case applying 
the established rules of Aguilar. Furthermore, the case involves 
an anonymous letter, a notoriously unreliable source of 
information. 
DISCUSSION: This case boils down to a factual disputeover 
whether it is more like Spinelli or Draper. Three Illinois 
courts decided that the corroboration in this case did not 
demonstrate that a tip in an anonymous letter provided probable 
cause. Although the tip ultimately proved correct, there was no 
reason to believe that the author of the letter would tell the 
truth, and the police investigation revealed no criminal 
activity. The Illinois S Ct might have reasonably found probable 
-
cause, based on the corroboration of several details in the 
.... 
letter. But its decision is not clearly in error, and this case 
is fact-bound. 
I recommend denial. 
-
. 
